What AI & LLM Penetration Testing Actually Looks Like (And What It Doesn’t)

What AI & LLM Penetration Testing Actually Looks Like (And What It Doesn’t)
Feb 16, 2026
Mike Shelton
Head of Pentesting
There’s a lot of talk right now about “securing AI,” and a lot of it doesn’t reflect how real systems are actually built or attacked.
Most AI and LLM penetration tests don’t involve exotic tools or breaking the underlying model. We’re not retraining anything, and we’re not trying to outsmart the math. What we’re doing is much closer to traditional application security, just with a new interface and a few new failure modes.
Once AI features are live, they’re exposed to real users, real data, and real abuse. That’s where things get interesting, and where assumptions tend to fall apart.
In practice, AI and LLM testing is about understanding how much authority the surrounding application has handed to the model, how inputs and outputs are handled, and what happens when someone starts pushing on those boundaries intentionally.
What AI & LLM Penetration Testing Is
At its core, AI and LLM testing focuses on misuse, abuse, and unintended behavior. That includes how models are integrated, how inputs and outputs are handled, and how much trust the surrounding system places in the model’s responses.
Some of the most common areas we test include:
Prompt Injection as a Business Logic Issue
Prompt injection gets framed as a novelty a lot of the time, usually in the context of making a model say something it shouldn’t.
That’s not how it shows up in real systems.
In practice, prompt injection behaves much more like a business logic problem. The attacker isn’t chasing funny output. They’re trying to bypass workflows, override instructions, or influence what the application does next.
Attackers aren’t just trying to make a model say something inappropriate. They’re trying to:
Override system instructions
Bypass intended workflows
Influence downstream actions
Extract internal context or logic
If a model can be convinced to ignore guardrails or act outside its intended role, the issue usually isn’t the model itself; it’s how much authority the application has delegated to it.
Over-Trust Model Output
I’ve seen teams assume the model output was “safe” simply because it came from an internal system, even when that output was being shaped by user-controlled input.
A common failure pattern is treating LLM output as:
Sanitized
Authorized
Correct by default
When AI responses are fed directly into other systems, rendered without validation, or used to make decisions automatically, small manipulations can have an outsized impact. This is especially risky when AI output influences permissions, financial actions, or data access.
From a testing perspective, this looks a lot like classic trust boundary violations, just with a new source of input.
Weak Input and Output Controls
Many AI implementations apply controls inconsistently:
Filtering exists at the UI but not the API
Guardrails differ across endpoints
Environmental differences lead to unexpected behavior
We often see stronger controls in demos or primary workflows, with weaker protections in edge cases or secondary integrations. Attackers look for those gaps.
Testing focuses on whether controls are applied uniformly and whether they can be bypassed with alternate inputs, formats, or request paths.
Context Leakage and Data Boundaries
LLMs often operate with more context than users realize. That can include:
System prompts
Retrieved documents
Prior conversation state
Embedded operational logic
If those boundaries aren’t carefully enforced, users may be able to infer or extract information that was never intended to be exposed. This is especially relevant in systems using retrieval-augmented generation or shared context across users.
From a security standpoint, this is a data exposure problem, not an AI novelty.
Abuse Scenarios at Scale
AI features that seem safe for individual users can become dangerous when automated.
We test for:
Rate limit bypasses
Enumeration via AI endpoints
Prompt-driven automation
Abuse paths that only appear at volume
These issues often don’t show up in functional testing, but they matter in real-world threat models where attackers operate at scale.
Monitoring and Logging Gaps
Many teams can’t answer basic questions about their AI systems:
What inputs were received?
What outputs were generated?
Were guardrails triggered?
What data was accessed?
Without proper logging and observability, detecting abuse or responding to incidents becomes extremely difficult. Testing helps identify where visibility is missing and where assumptions about monitoring don’t hold up.
What AI & LLM Penetration Testing Isn’t
Just as important is being clear about what this type of testing does not cover.
AI and LLM penetration testing is not:
Model accuracy testing
Bias or fairness analysis
Performance optimization
Retraining or fine-tuning
Evaluating whether the model gives “good” answers
Those are valuable activities, but they fall outside the scope of security testing. Penetration testing focuses on adversarial behavior, not model quality.
How AI Testing Fits into Existing Security Programs
AI and LLM testing isn’t a replacement for traditional penetration testing. It’s an extension of it.
Most AI-related findings still map back to familiar categories:
Input validation failures
Authorization issues
Data exposure
Business logic flaws
Abuse and automation risk
The difference is the interface. Instead of forms or APIs alone, attackers are interacting with probabilistic systems that behave differently under pressure.
Organizations that already test their applications regularly are often well-positioned to add AI testing, as long as they adjust their threat models and assumptions accordingly.
When AI & LLM Penetration Testing Makes Sense
This type of testing is most valuable when:
AI features are exposed to end users
Model output drives decisions or actions
Sensitive data is involved
Automation or integrations depend on AI responses
Compliance or customer trust is a factor
If AI is already in production, the real question isn’t whether security matters; it’s whether the AI components have been tested with the same rigor as the rest of the system.
Final Thoughts
Securing AI doesn’t require mysticism or fear-driven thinking. It requires understanding how real attackers interact with real systems.
AI and LLM penetration testing focuses on practical risk, realistic abuse, and the places where new technology intersects with old security lessons. When approached that way, it becomes a natural part of a mature security program, not a separate or experimental exercise.